FEDERAL POWER OVER INTRASTATE RAILROAD
RATES.
When the United States entered the World War its railroads were not rendering the prompt and efficient service to which
the country was entitled and which must be secured if the war
were to be waged successfully. The imperative needs of the country forced the Government to take over the railroad systems
throughout the length and breadth of the land, to spend large
sums of money on repairs and belated improvements, and to operate the railroadg as a unit.
The difficulty could notJiave been met by any appeal to the
owners of the roads. They were as patriotic as any body of
citizens; but it was simply impossible for them to improve the
service adequately. The difficulty was not due to mismanagement,
for the operating officials7 were efficient, and some of them veritable masters of transportation. Not was it possible by transferring a manager of unusual ability from one railroad to another
railroad, with whose problems he was- unfamiliar', to secure immediately the *necessary improvement in service. Nor would it
have been sufficient simply to appropriate funds for the improvement of the railroads. It is true that the railroads were undernourished. For years their incomes had been inadequate, and
after 1914 they could not compete with war industries for the
capital which they needed for betterments and extensions. But
no appropriation could have immediately given to the railroads
adequate equipment, adequate trackage and adequate terminal
facilities. It would have taken time as well as money to have
built up properly the railroad system of the country-and the
Nation could not have waited for the necessary -changes nor
could it have spared the man-power which would have been taken
from the army, the navy and the essential war industries.
The Government did spend, during the war, nearly one and
a half billion dollars in building up the railroads; but that expenditure alohe would not have brought alout the necessary improvement in transportation. It was necessary also, in the emer(II).
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gency, to go further and pool the railroad resources of the country, to disregard the boundaries marked by private ownership
and by State lines and to set aside regulations and restrictions
which, however, well adapted to other times, were preventing the
full use of the railroad facilities which the country then possessed. It was necessary to operate the railroads of the country
as a unit, to transfer equipment freely from one railroad to another and to use terminal facilities in common.
And when the war was over and the railroads were returned
to their former owners, the American people had learned a great
lesson. The Transportation Act of i92o was legislation of a new
type. Instead of simply regulating transportation and forbidding
wrongful practices, Congress sought to extend positive aid to the
carriers that their roads might be more efficient aids to interstate commerce, and, to that end, it gave them greater freedom of
action and it protected them against antagonistic State regulation.
The Act made a temporary guaranty of incomes to the railroad and express companies and gave very important directions
to the commission for the purpose of better assuring to the
railroads adequate revenues, and in some cases more than adequate revenues, thereafter. It facilitated the consolidation oi
railroads and express companies and the pooling of the earnings or traffic of railroads. It gave directions for the joint use of
facilities and the establishment of joint rates. After pr6viding
that a railroad might not extend or abandon its line or any portion thereof, or issue securities, without the authorization of the
commission,. it went further and provided that no other authorization should be n'ecessary. These clauses of.he Act protected the
railroads against unnecessary competition and against the requiremenf of unnecessary services, regardless of State authorities, and
probably regardless of any contracts into which the railroad might
have entered. And the Act protected the interstate business more
fully than theretofore by giving to the commission more complete authority to revise any charge or practice which gives any
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undue or unreasonable advantage to intrastate transportation as
against interstate transportation.
Congress sought to build up the carriers, to harmonize their
relations with each other and with their employees, and to discourage useless or unfair competitioi between carriers or between interstate and intrastate rates.
Observe that Congress made a departure in legislating as
to interstate carriers instead of simply regulating the interstate
transportation of carriers. It dealt with some matters as to
interstate carriers which had theretofore been left to the States.
This applies not only to the provisions as to extensions, abandonments and securities and the encouragement of co-operation
and consolidation as contrasted with competition, but also to the
provisions which apparently direct that carriers be allowed to
earn an adequate return from their business as a whole upon
their property devoted to transportation as a whole (and not
merely an adequate income from their interstate business based
upon that portion of their property assignable for purposes of
computation to interstate transportation), and it applies to theother provisions which enlarge the power of the commission over
intrastate rates and to those provisions which deal with labor
disputes.
ioreover, Congress authorizes the commission to
group railroads and "to establish uniform rates upon competitive traffic which will adequately sustain all the carriers which are
engaged in such traffic and which are indispensable to the communities to which they render the service of transportation," although it thereby enables "some of such carriers to receive a net
railway operating income substantially and unreasonably in exces s of a fair return upon the value of their iailway property held
for and used in the service of transportation."
In several of the states the railroad commissions have not
fully supported the efforts which Congress made through this
legislation to improve the railroad systeni of the'country, and it
has been necessary to appeal to the courts, and finally to the Suprerne Court, for aid in enforcing the Transportation Act.
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The leading cases were those from Wisconsin and from New
York, both of which were decided by the court of last resort on
the twenty-seventh of February, 1922, the opinions being written
by Chief Justice Taft. In those cases the Interstate Commerce
Commission had ordered railroads which were engaged in interstate transportation to increase their charges for intrastate transportation to correspond to the rates which the Commission had
previously established for interstate transportation, and those
orders were sustained by the lower Federal courts and by the
Supreme Court.
As the Chief Justice pointed out, the Transportation Act
imposed upon the Interstate Commerce Commission an affirmative duty to fix rates and to take other important steps to maintain an adequate railway serice for the people of the United
States. Intrastate rates and the income from them must play an
important part in maintaining such a service, and if there is a disparity between interstate and intrastate rates which unduly discriminates agairist interstate commerce, the Commission is authorized to end the disparity by directly removing it.
"Congress in its control of its interstate commerce system is
seeking in the Transportation Act to inake the system adequate to the
needs of the country by securing.for it a reasbnable compensatory
return for all the work it does. The states are seeking to use that
same system for intrastate traffic. That entails large duties and expenditures on the interstate commerce system which may burden it
unless compensation is received for the intrastate business reasonably proportionate to that for the interstate business. Congress as
the dominant controller of interstate commerce may, therefore, restrain undue limitation of the earning power of the interstate commerce system in doing state work. The affirmative power: of Congress in developing interstate conimerce agencies is clear. In such
development, it can impose any ieasonable condition on a state's use
of interstate carriers for intrastate commerce, it deems necessary or
desirable. This is because of the supremacy of the national power
in this field."
The court so declared in the case of the Railroad Commission of Wisconsin against the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy.
Railroad Company. In the case of the State of New York
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against the United States, the court went even further and decided that even where the State had a charter contract with the
New York Central Railway Company, by which the latter was
bound to charge not more than two cents a mile for passenger
transportation between Albany and Buffalo, Congress might
nevertheless authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to
increase those rates.
"Anything which directly obstructs and thus regulates commerce which is carried on among the states, whether it is state legislation or private contracts between individuals or corporationsi
should be subject to the power of Congress in the regulation of that
commerce"
Two weeks after these decisions were announced, the court
decided the Eastern Texas Railroad case, in which it passed upon
the power of the Interstate Conerce Commission to authorize
the abandonment of railroad operations. The company, which
conducted both interstate and intrastate transportation) had been
operated at a loss for several years. Its operating expenses were
about $5,000 per month greater than its operating revenues, and,
in view of the condition of the'road because of its operation at
a loss it would be necessAry in the near future to expend large
sums of money upon "repairs to roadways, bridges and trestles,
-if operations were to be continued without great danger to life
and property.
The Interstate Commerce Commission authorized the company to abandon completely the operation of its line, acting under
the provisions of the Transportation Act which empowered the
Commission to authorize a railroad subject to the Act to abandon
all or any portion'of a line of railroad-or the operation thereof
and authorized the company thereupon to abandon operations
without securin any other approval. The State contended that,
while the Commission might authorize the company to abandon
interstate operations, the Act did not empower it to authorize the
railroad to abandon intrastate operations without the consent of
the State; and the court of last resort sustained this contention.
The decision was based upon the ground, not expressly
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stated and not discusscd ky the court, that the Eastern Texas
Railroad Company was entirely within the State of Texas, and
while all of its outstanding stock had been owned for more than
fifteen years by an interstate railroad company, the St. Louis
Southwestern, the two companies were distinct entities.
The court declared that
"Interstate and foreign commerce will not be burdened or
affected by any shortage in the earnings, nor will any carrier in such
commerce have to bear or make good the shortage. It is not as if
the road were a branch or extension whose unremunerative operation would or might burden or cripple the main line and thereby
affect its utility or service as an artery of interstate and foreign commerce."
The court thus dearly indicated that where the line of track
was a part of an interstate railroad system the rule might well be
different and an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
authorizing the abandonment of both'interstate and intrastate operations be sustained.
These cases, of course, do not dispose of all of the important
questions which may arise under the Transportation Act. The
court, however, has shown most dearly that Congress may take
positive steps in assisting the railroad companies of the country
to build tip an adequate and efficient transportation system and
that the States may not so regulate the intrastate activities of
interstate companies as to thwart the efforts of the Federal Government.
Whatever may have been the fact before the era of the
steanboat and the locomotive, at the present day steam and
electricity have welded commerce into an indissoluble unit for
n ary practic,l1 purposes%and, among these, thie orn-t ronqpwiclolls
is the regulation of the great corporations which operate the interstate railroads of this Nation. Each of these railroads is subject to regulation, not merely by the political state, but by the
larger organization which we call human society.The banks, in loaning their credit and furnishing the necessary means of constructing the railroad, take no account of the
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legal distinction between interstate and domestic commerce. They
loan to the corporation as a unit, and no dollar of the funds
which they supply can be allocated by any rule either to interstate or intrastate commerce.
The contractors, engineers, and builders of the road are
also unable, in the nature of things, to regulate their operations
by any legal distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce. The road that they grade, the ties that they lay, the rails
that they nail down, the tunnels they dig, the terminals they erect,
the rolling stock that is constructed, are one and all used quite
indiscriminately in interstate and domestic commerce and -without
any legal distinction between them. Mechanically, as financially.
the corporation is an indivisible unit.
Then, the road must be operated by labor; and here arises a
source of non-governmental regulation which has meant a tremendous burden upon the transportation companies, for labor is
highly organized and the corporation deals with its leaders, and
these leaders, in prescribing the conditions upon which engineers,
firemen, conductors, and brakemen will operate the roads, take
no account of any distinction between interstate and intrastate
commerce, but, themselves acting as a unit, they render their services to the corporation as a unit-even as the financier ad the
contractor have done.
The very act of transportation again illustrates the indivisibility from a practical standpoint and not as a legal abstraction
of this indivisible thing that we call commerce, for, whether the
transportation be wholly within or beyond the State, it runs upon
the same rails, it plerces' the same tunnels, it employs the same
motive power and rolling stock, and the same train moves for
one passenger in intrastate commerce and for another in interstate commerce, but, as stated, its propulsion is due to economic
and mechanical forces that have no reference to the legal distinction.
If, therefore, the legal distinction %Ahich seeks to make a
duality of an essential unity does not c6nform to the nature of
these economic f6rces, it is obvious that our laws are not only
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not in harmony but are lagging behind the economic forces which
they are designed to protect and promote.
Fortunately, there is no such rigidity in our political system. Its genius lies in its elasticity and in its adaptability to the
ever increasing changes of the most progressive nation in the
world. The-far-seeing vision of the great Chief Justice realized
this in the great case of McCulloch v. Maryland (4 IWheat. 316,
415), when he said:

"This provision is made in a Constitution intended to endure
for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs."
In other words, the evolution of the commerce power of the
country has been a consistent adaptation of Federal power to
those crises, which have been brought about by a mechanical age,
which has more profoundly revolutionized human thought and
human conditions than any similar change in all the preceding
centuries of human existence.
It may be frankly admitted that when the framers of the
Constitution provided that "the Congress shall have power to
regulate commerce

.

.

.

among the several States" they did

not have in mind, and in the nature of the case could not have
had in mind, the application of this grant of power to the conditions of human society which were about to be profoundly
revolutionized. Undoubtedly, they did not intend, as conditions
of society then prevailed, to take from the States the primary,
regulation of the instrumentalities of commerce. In that day
there were very few corporations, 'and those almost 6xclusively
banking institutions. Indeed, -their idea of commerce was largely
restricted to sailing vessels wliich bore .mechandise from tthe
port of one State to the port of another State. It was not within
their contemplation that it would be applied. to the conditions of
land travel.
A condition in which land travel would be revolutionized
by the utilization of steam power was beyond their anticipation,
for, when the Constitution was adopted, the only vehicles of corn-
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merce outside of the sailing vessel were the horse, the stagecoach, the wagon and the wheelbarrow. Mfore than half a century was to elapse before the first railroad should be commenced,
and, while at the very time of the Constitutional Convention a
Connecticut Yankee, by the name of Fitch, was experimenting
with the steamboat, a full generation was to pass before the prow
of the Clermont was to divide the waters of the Hudson.
The fact is that in those days the primary regulation of -commerce, whether interstate or domestic, could, in the nature of the
case, only be for the States. Men lived and died without ever
leaving the communities in which they were born. Only a few,
and those the wealthy, ever crossed the boundary of the State.
Each community was sufficient to itself. Human society was
then not so highly organized that a man would feel impoverished
if the four corners of the world did not pay tribute to his breakfast table. With few exceptions, men lived upon that wAich was
raised within their immediate vicinity, and even that which they
themselves developed. It was still the time when Adam delved
and Eve span, and the idea that the Congress should .regulate
their little commercial enterprises, which were almost wholly
intrastate and conducted by individuals, not corporations, was to
them inconceivable
What, then, did the Fathers truly intend by this inspired
grant of power? , It is my belief that their true intention was
that the new government which they were creating should have a
concurrent but a jaramountpower, and that this paramount power
would only be exercised when the laws of the States resulted in
conflicting regulations to the injury of the Union. The Federal
Government was to be the arbiter,,or, shall I say, its function was
to be that of the governor in a machine.
That this was the immediate application of their far-reaching
grant of power is indubitably shown by the fact that for nearly
one hundred years the Congress did not regulate land transportation by any 16gislation, excepting only the grants which it made
to the transcontinental railroads shortly. after the Civil War. The
creation of corporate' instrumentalities, the regulation of oth
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intrastate and interstate roads, as well as all other regulations
of commerce, were primarily the concern of the States, but at
all times subject to the paramount authority of the Federal Government to bring them into harmony, in order to avoid the evils
of conflicting regulations which had. been the chief reason -for
the creation of the new Ration.
Moreover, in the early days of railroad transportation there
were insuperable natural obstacles to the creation of great interstate carriers. Railroads were very primitive affairs-so primitive that for many years after the building of the first railroad
it was a subject of earnest and heated discussion among thoughtful men whether the canal or the railroad would be the true
method of transportation. Railroads could not then tunnel mountains or cross rivers: of necessity, their operations terminated
whenever a natural obstacle was interposed. Thus, bgtveen
Albany and Buffalo there were, as late as the middle of the nineteenth century, eleven different railroads. The journey to New
York was made from Philadelphia to Perth Amboy, where a ship
was taken to cross Sandy Hook Bay. The Pennsylvania Railroad ran from Philhdelphia to Columbia, and when it finally
reached the Allegheny Mountains it necessarily came to -a stop,
and passengers were taken by a portage road over the Alleghenies
and then a new railroad took them to Pittsburgh.
The natural obstacles which thus made for small railroads
naturally resulted in their primary and almost exclusive regulation by the States; and the policy of the States was to give almost
unrestricted rights of private ownership, for the obvious reason
that there was so little faith in the future of American railroads
that the States would not contribute out of public funds and the'
money was contributed by citizens not as a sound financial investment, but practically as a public charity. Thus, the subscrip-.
tions :to the Pennsylvania Railroad were obtained by begging
them from house to house, as though it were a hospital and not
a necessary instrumentality of commerce.
All this made for the localization of.railroads and for unrestricted rights of private ownership, and it is not unnatural that
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the abuses of such unregulated private ownership led to some of
the blackest chapters in the financial history of our Nation.
During all this time a system of legal regulation was in the
slow process of development-not by "the Congress," to which
the Constitution had directly intrusted it-but by the judiciary,
and notably by the Supreme Court. In this was no usurpation of
power, for this system of regulation by judicial veto was derived
from the powers of the court as established in the great case of
Marbury v. Madison. In other words, the written Constitution
would not have been workable if there had not been a balance
wheel to keep all the parts in harmonious operation. Thus, the
Supreme Court during the full century when the Congress remained inactive in regulating interstate commerce, was building
up a great and sagacious system of regulation by a series of decisions which determined what the Nation might do and what the
States might do. Of necessity, these decisions were a series of
great negations, for the judicial department of the Government
had no power to legislate affirmativcly. All that it could do
was to interpose the negation of its veto when either the Nation
invaded the powers of the States, or, more commonly, ihe States
invaded the powers of the Nation. *The power thus exercised was
one of extraordinary difficulty and delicacy. It"
required the
Supreme Court to proceed with the very greatest caution from
concrete case to concrete case lest it be accused by a usurpation of
power of violating the very Constitution which it was sworn to
defend.
The court, however, has alays recognized that, as human
society became more concentrated and complicated, all powers,
Federal and State, have a necessary reaction upon each other.
With or without political institutions, steam and electricity have
woven the commercial intercourse of the country into substantial
unity, and this unity is therefore an indivisible unity. Therefore, it was futile for the political government in solving many
practical problems to attempt to make any division. All that the
Federal Government could do, as the Supreme Court wisely declared, was to recognize as a broad principle that whenever the
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public necessity required that the States should exercise no power
whatever, because of its direct and substantial effect upon the
current of interstate commerce, the States were powerless, but
that in all matters where the effect upon interstate commerce was
indirect or insubstantial or where it related to a subject matter
as to which a uniform rule was not required for the common'
good, the States could legislate as to commerce, subject to the
power of Congress to. determine otherwise when in its judgment
the interests of interstate commerce required a uniform rule.
While this evolution of the Federal power was in progress
great changes were taking place in human society, due to the
revolutionary results of the utilization of steam power, electricity,
and, later, petroleum. The Nation had ceased to be a congeries
of little local unities. It had become inextricably interwoven by
steel and copper. The local road no longer sufficed to meet the
commercial necessities of the Nation. A vast empire to the west
of the Alleghenies had been slowly developed. The Civil War
had shown the necessity for great corporate instrumentalities
which could build roads, not of a few hundred miles, but of many
thousands of miles.
The reaction upon our political institutions was necessarily
very profound. The conception of commerce and of its unity
became one of which the framers of the Constitution only va ,uely
dreamed. Slowly it was realized that the prosperity of America
depended upon the harvesting machine and the locomotive. The
pressure of population in the East, accentuated by the discoviery
of gold in California, largely delocalized the railroad as a corporate instrumentality. The Government itself entered upon a
period of railroad building which has made of America the
greatest transportation nation of the world, and without which
its present growth and dominant power in the councils of civilization would have been impossible. It chartered great railroad corporations, granting to one, the Union Pacific, an area in land
alone greater than the State of New York and with a financialsubventior, of $16,ooo per mile upon level ground, of $32,000
per mile in the hill cotmntry, and $48,0oo per mile in the moun-
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tains. From 1850 to 1871 the Congress voted to railroads an
area of land five times as great as that of the State of Pennsylvania, and thus recognized that America could not grow without
a Nation-wide commerce and that the essential instrumentality
thereof was a subsidized governmental road.Unfortunately, the regulation of these roads was still left
in private hands subject only to State laws, and the Congress
awoke all too slowly to the necessity of Federal regulation.
Those were the days of the Drews, and Jay Goulds, and the
railroad wreckers of that class. The evils of such selfish management became intolerable. By unfair and oppressive methods
one man was destroyed and another enriched beyond the dreams
of avarice. One city waxed great and the other waned. Whole
sections-as, for example, the farming interests in the Eastfound themselves paralyzed as by a creeping paralysis, as freight
was hauled from the wheat belt of Dakota to London cheaper
than was possible for the farmer who tilled the ground only a
few miles from the Atlantic seaboard. It became perfectly
obvious that unless the evils of private ownership could be abated
these great railroad corporations, which were no longer local, but
of nation-wide power and influence, would not only go far to
destroy the power of the States, not merely by corruption but by
the power which they exercised over the property and prosperity
of the citizen, but they would even constitute a serious menace to
the Nation itself.
It was at that time that the Supreme Court rendered the
first of its great decisions with respect to the nature of railroad
corporations when, in 1877, it decided the Granger Cases. They
stripped the railroad of its supposed private character, and
stamped it as a semi-governmental instrumentality by holding, to
use the legal phrase, that it was "impressed with a public use."
A full century after the Constitution was adopted Congress,
yielding not merely to the so-called granger movement but to the
widespread desire of citizens of all classes, passed the first interstate commerce law; and from that time to the passage of the
Transportation Act legislation has been a series of advancing
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steps whereby Congress, in behalf of the whole Nation, seeks to
end the abuses of transportation and to regulate the commerce of
the Nation.
I do not say interstate'commerce alone, for commerce had
by this time become, through the development of mechanical
power and through the growth of great nation-wide corporations,
so indivisible for many purposes that it was impossible to divide
it into water-tight 'compartments. To legislate with reference
to interstate commerce without assuming an incidental but necessary control over intrastate commerce, had become impracticable
with the progress of human society.
While in the mere matter of geography there is still possible
a distinction between interstate termini and intrastate termini.
yet, in dealing with the instrumentality of commerce, namely, the
corporation, and all that it utilizes to make transportation possible,
an attempt to allocate any of the functions of any such instrumentality as credit, construction, operation, income, expenditures,
to interstate and domestic commerce is a practical impossibility.
Even before the recent cases under the Transportation Act
had arisen the Supreme Court had recognized that interstate
and intrastate commerce are, for many purposes, so interwoven
that their division is impracticable. Thus, in Baltimore & Ohio
Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission (221 U. S.
612), the court said (p. 618):
"But the argument, undoubtedly, involves the consideration
that the interstate and intrastate operations of interstate carriers are
so interwoven that it is utterly impracticable for them to divide their
employees in such manner that the duties of those who are engaged
in connection zith interstate commerce shall be confined to that cowinerce erclu.ively. And thus, many employees who have to do with
the movement of trains in interstate transportation .are, by virtue of
practical necessity, also employed in intrastate transportation."This consideration, however, lends no support to the contention that the statute is invalid. For there cannot be denied to Congress the effective exercise of its constitutional authority. By virtue of its power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, Congress may enact.laws for the safeguarding of the persofis and property that are transported in that commerce and of those who are
employed in transporting them."
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The most notable expression, however, of the indivisibility
of commerce for many practical purposes is that suggested in the
Minnesota Rate cases (230 U. S. 352), where this court said
(pp. 432, 433):
"If the situfation.has becond such, by reason of the interblending of the interstate and intrastate operations of interstate carriers,
that adequate regulation of their interstate rates cannot be inain:
tamed without imposing requircnents-withrespect to their intrastate
rates which substantially affect the former, it is for Congress to de-

termnine, within the limits of its constitutional authority over interstate cominerce and its instruments the measure of the regulation it
should supply."

The court of last resort has thus recognized repeatedly the
fact that, whatever may have been the conditions which existed
when the Constitution was adopted and in the early days of this
country's history, interstate and intrastate transportation are today in many respects inextricably intermingled, so that the effective regulation of carriers which are engaged in interstate
transportation may require also the regulation of the same carriers when they are engaged in intrastate transportation.
As to rates the court of last retort has already spoken in the
clear and forcible language of our able" Chief Justice. As to
railroad co-operation, railroad reorganization, and the many
other matters dealt with in the Transportation Act, the court has
not yet spoken. But, in view of the position which the court has
already taken, when we consider the defects which our railroad
system showed in a great emergency, defects which could not
have been cured immediately by any effort whatever, it seems improbable that the court will ever declare invalid the great constructive legislation by which Congress in the Transportation Act
of 1920 has sought to remedy those defects and to build up a
transportation system which will meet the great needs of our
country both in times of peace and in times of war.
James Al. Beck.
IWashington, D. C.

